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Abstract
Undoubtely, our daily lives have drastically changed over the years, shifting
from a traditional to a more electronic way of living and communicating. This
is the main reason that cyber-crook profession is booming and authorities or
agencies have found themselves in a difficult situation while trying to deal with
this rapidly spreading plague. As a consequence, new words, like cyber-war,
cyber-espionage and cyber-crime, have emerged. Within this context, 2011, has
been both the year of cyber-security awareness, as countless cyber-attacks found
their way to the news headlines and the year with most intrusions ever aimed
at companies and government agencies.
Thus, a common problem among organizations nowadays is Information Sys-
tem security management in an effective way. In order to do that, organizations
need to know at any given point in time how secure their ISs are. This work pro-
poses a novel methodology for the security quantification of ISs using stochastic
calculus. Adopting the proposed methodology will enable any organization to
quantify the security level of its ISs in an unbiased and accurate way.
Keywords: Security metrics, Stochastic calculus, security quantification
1. Introduction
In today's modern corporate world, corporations are struggling to keep their
competitive edge over their rivals and boost up their market share, along with
their profits. It is undoubtedly safe to say, that cyber-crime is damaging this
effort. Within this volatile as well as intriguing corporate environment, securing
the Information Systems (IS) that a corporation has is more crucial than ever.
However, security cannot be managed if it cannot be measured [1]. Thus, a new
problem arises that, of measuring the security level of an IS.
Another critical factor that points to the same direction is that, corporations
try to handle their security risk exposure, by adopting various standards or best
Email addresses: dmermigas@gmail.com (Dimitrios Mermigas), patsakik@scss.tcd.ie
(Constantinos Patsakis), spirounias@yahoo.com (Sotirios Pirounias)
1
practices, and/or by implementing a series of counter measures for mitigating
their risk. However, for an effective and efficient design of any counter measure,
one has to know what the corporation's residual risk is, which is the amount
of risk that it undertakes. Perhaps, this is one of the most difficult problems
that risk managers are facing nowadays, as business environment complexity has
grown exponentially over the past years. Regarding the Information Technology
(IT) environment, this is translated to the usage of sophisticated ISs that work
together within the corporation, providing the desired support of its business
in a 24x7 basis. Hence, the problem remains the same: How a risk manager or
any other manager can make an educated decision about the security level of
the corporation's ISs? Moreover, if the security level of the corporation's ISs is
unknown, how can one design effective and efficient security counter measures?
To this end, our work presents a new methodology for quantifying the secu-
rity level of the corporation's IS or any other software product. In our method-
ology we propose the use of stochastic calculus, which can handle the time
factor along with random phenomena of known distributions. Our approach is
not as theoretical as it may appear, but rather practical as it employs the use
of virtually all disclosed vulnerabilities, for well-known software vendors and
their products. Moreover, it enables us to provide an unbiased, reliable and
solid number that depicts the security level of an IS, utilizing mathematical
methodologies, that are already used in Finance.
2. Background Work
Studies in the area of security assessment adopt methodologies of analysis
that are basically of two kinds: Vulnerability-specific and vulnerability category-
specific. The proposed methodology, based on the definition of the technical
risk factor, is neither of the first nor of the second kind and is aimed to provide
unbiased and objective results, that can be applied to a more corporate profile.
The degree of applicability of such a methodology is achieved more efficiently
using a more general aspect of vulnerability categorization rather than using
the existing vulnerability taxonomies.
In [2] a characteristic vulnerability-specific analysis is given, which tries to
connect each vulnerability category to a security level so that risk analysis will
be focused on vulnerabilities with higher risk. The authors perform a statistical
analysis of the accumulative vulnerabilities of several major operating systems
in order to identify repeatable patterns in the datasets and model vulnerability
growth. In this work the focus is on the size of the vulnerabilities population and
the growth trends. We believe that analysis of the accumulative vulnerabilities,
that an Operating System (OS) historically exhibited, should focus on time
distribution patterns using specific time periods i.e. certain weekdays or certain
months of a year. We illustrate that such patterns have more significance in
security quantification than the absolute amount of vulnerabilities through time
on which this analysis is focused.
Peotta and Gondim [3] pose the problem caused by the extensive reliance
on subjective, qualitative inputs for security assessment. The major goal of our
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research is to solve this crucial problem and achieve objectivity at satisfactory
levels. In this work the authors suggest the use of historical data and the
application of proper analytical techniques to identify security risk trends and
correlations. They also recommend the focus to be on software components
and applications rather on specific vulnerabilities or vulnerability categories. In
our research we suggest that the focus should be on the same level of security
risk factors, and we propose the use of a more formalistic method for security
measurement, verified by historical data.
In [4] the author tries to provide evidence of how effective security solutions
were in reducing risks, as well as what kind of reduction in the risk level we
expect from security solutions in general. So, he introduces a security metrics
taxonomy for Information Communication Technology (ICT) products, based
on his extensive research of the worldwide bibliography. His proposed model
of taxonomy is a high-level information security metrics taxonomy, that incor-
porates metrics for both organizational information security management and
product development. He argues that security is a topic that involves all the
employees of an organization. Therefore, one should take advantage of the expe-
rience gained from the others and not try to re-invent the wheel, as he states.
Although his taxonomy produces a coherent snapshot of an organization, it
does not provide with the tools to come up with a solid number for measuring
security level for a product or service.
In [5] a metric called attack surface is defined, which can be used by both
the industry and the consumers. They authors envisioned that software develop-
ers, as well as consumers, could use this tool to periodically measure the attack
surface of their system and compare it with their previous measurements. This
comparison could give the desired security level measurement of their system.
Their definition of the attack surface is the set of ways in which an adver-
sary can attack the system. In order to measure the attack surface they have
introduced two notions; the damage potential and the effort. As the damage
potential -of a system resource being attacked- gets higher, the higher the attack
surface of that system becomes. On the other hand, the higher the effort, that
a potential attacker needs in order to gain access to the system and produce
damage, the lower the system's attack surface is. It is indeed a way to produce
a metric for security level quantification, but we believe that the effort notion
is not objective, so the metric will be biased.
The I3P in [6], follows a more practical approach, it proposes a multi-factor
scoring system for better accommodation of the decision making process through
the management levels of the company. The author argues that if a company
addresses the risks that stem from IT security issues, it provides a solution for
them as well. Therefore, it is rather a managerial problem than a technical one.
The proposed scoring system includes scoring methods that exists in risk-based
markets, such as, credit scoring, bond rating, cyber vulnerability scoring, cyber
insurance questionnaires, the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI),
and ISO cyber security standards and benchmarks. It cannot be argued that
incorporating risk addressing methods, industry standards and frameworks, as
well as best practices really helps in building a more secure IS environment.
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However, it does not provide us with an unbiased method for quantifying the
security level of a system.
As mentioned earlier, a metric implies a system of measurement. In [7] the
authors researched further on the characteristics of a metric for a measurement
system and the categories that a metric falls into. According to them, a good
metric should be specific, measurable, achievable, repeatable -that is being able
to be reproduced by a third party- and time-dependent. They argue that any
metric falls into one of four big categories which are, Risk Management Metrics,
Budget Management Metrics, Audit and Compliance Assessment Metrics and
finally Security Operations Metrics. Their approach is with no doubt needed in
order to clarify metrics and measurements but it aims to categorize the metrics
found -or to be found- and not to produce a method for assessing the security
level of an IS.
In [8] a quantitative risk assessment methodology, named (QuERIES), is
proposed, based on the combination of computer science theory, economic the-
ory, game theory and control theory. For quantifying the results, they use finite
Markov chains. Finally, they use the Information -or decision- Markets Theory,
from the area of economics, in order to project their findings to the future and
produce an estimation of the probability and costs of successful attacks, against
proposed and deployed security technologies. The theoretical background used,
is by no means in dispute, and is based on large amounts of historical data in
the industries of finance and insurance. However, they state that due to "the
absence of a theoretical framework and actuarial-class data about information
assurance", the data used for the proposed model, came from simulation of
attack models and therefore are subjective and biased.
3. Methodology
In order to quantify the security our approach uses stochastic calculus. As
stock prices daily change affecting the valuation of the portfolios that comprise
it, we similarly regard an IS a set of components which have every day a different
value. By aggregating these values, we have the security level of our system. In
the case of stocks many models use stochastic calculus in order to forecast the
upcoming values and we adopt the same tools to approximate the security level
of an IS in certain periods of time. The approach that we make is vulnerability
driven, meaning that we take into consideration already disclosed vulnerabilities
to quantify current security level.
We assume that, the disclosure of vulnerabilities and patches are fluctuations
of random Brown movements, which are made on top of known deterministic
movements of the security status of the components of an information system.
Therefore, we will regard that these fluctuations can be modeled by It	o pro-
cesses.
We assume that our IS I consists of n+1 components, which can be anything
from hardware to software and at time t the security status of each component
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of I is determined by the vectors
S(t, ω) = (S0(t, ω), S1(t, ω), ..., Sn(t, ω))
Vector S(t, ω) is a set of stochastic processes parametrized by time variable
t ∈ R+, t ∈ [0, α].
Each It	o process is of the form
dS0 = r(t, ω)S0dt
dSi = µi(t, ω, Si)dt+
m∑
i=1
σij(t, ω, Si)dBj(t)
= µi(t, ω, Si)dt+ σdB(t)
We should note that in this way we define more than one Brown movement
in the equations, modeling more than one independent random sources. Let's
see the advantage of this approach. Let c1 and c2 be the security level of two
services S1 and S2 running on a web server and a vulnerability is found for
this particular web server of our IS B1. Then the Brown movement B1 may
decrease the security status c2 of S2 more than c1. On the other hand a security
vulnerability B2 on our web server might decrease more c1than c2.
Definition 1. An installation is a Ft-adaptive process
θ(t, ω) = (θ0(t, ω), θ1(t, ω), ..., θn(t, ω)) ∈ Rn+1
Each θi(t, ω) corresponds to the security status of each installed component i at
time t.
The property of having each installation as an adaptive process, makes the
administrator decide what components to use or not at time t, based solely on
the information that he has up to that point and not letting the model have
time gaps by looking into the future.
Definition 2. The security level SL of an installation θ(t, ω) at time t is given
by
SLθ(t, ω) =
n∏
i=0
θi(t, ω)Si(t, ω)
The security level SL is thus a stochastic process itself which is adapted to Ft.
SL =
∫ t
0
∏
θidSi
As already proposed in [9], in order to calculate the security level, each
component i is assigned with a weight ci, which is governed by the time factor
and the amount of time that each component is being used. The model takes
5
into account the total security, therefore it considers the fact that a component
is not working in a 24 × 7 basis, so if there is a vulnerability on it, the system
is only partially exposed. Moreover, the model takes into consideration the
severity of the vulnerabilities of a component over time. This means that if
there are no recent known vulnerabilities, the weight is decreased, while in the
other case it increases. The same happens for the severity as well. In any case,
in order to create a model that allows comparison between components, we used
weighted entropy. Therefore, if we set:
pi =
number vulnerabilities of impact i
total number vulnerabilities
the weights are calculated by the following formula:
ci = −
n∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
tike
−kwjpijklog(pijk)
where:
• n is equal to the number of different impacts we have
• wj is the weight attributed to each vulnerability impact.
• m is the number of years that product i is in the market and pijk is the
probability that product i has a vulnerability of severity class j and it was
k years ago.
• tik represents the percentage use of component i, k years ago.
Hence, from all the above factors, only wj can be considered biased, so we use the
according CVSS [10], which is a highly regarded metric for vulnerabilities. This
formulates our security level with respect to time and the severity of disclosed
vulnerabilities as:
SL =
∫ t
0
∏
θ
1/ci
i dSi
Let's suppose that we have an IS and we want to measure its security level.
Firstly we divide it in separate and discrete software components. For each
component, we gather the disclosed vulnerabilities and we arrange them on
time frames so as to recognize possible patterns. Using these patterns, we may
compute the function θi for each component. The next step is to compute the
appropriate weight ci, for each θi. After that, we take the product of all these
functions, which is a stochastic process of one variable, namely time t.
In order to calculate the θ functions, we sum the CVSS scores of each dis-
closed vulnerability and we projected them in the time period we want. Sub-
sequently, we divide the daily CVSS sums with the total CVSS sum of each
component. The resulting values range from 0 to 1 and sum up to one. For
each product we exponentiate the respective values to the appropriate weight
1/ci. Since these values show how vulnerable the system is, we have to trans-
form them, to show how secure it is, hence we subtract each of the them from
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Figure 1: The security level of two ISs, as calculated by SQT [11].
number one, which denotes the totally secure system. Finally, if we want to end
up to one function to perform the integration, then for each day, we compute
the product of these values. Since we only have values at some distinct points,
we may use Fourier fitting, splines or other curve fitting methods to obtain a
continuous function, that returns us the security level of our IS.
To fascilitate the calculations and provide some practical examples, we have
developed a tool, SQT [11], which uses XML exports from the National Vul-
nerability Database [12], to quantify the security of an IS. Two examples for
two different IS configurations can be seen in Figure 1. The tool is released as
Open Source, exporting graphs that illustrate the security level of a given IS
and the changes over given time periods. In this implementation, each software
component is considered to be working 100% of the time, Fourier curve fitting
is being used, while NVD feeds provide the necessary vulnerability database.
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4. Conclusions
The increasing reliance of organizations upon their ISs reveals IT risks which
need to be effectively managed. For a successful mitigation of such risks, ap-
propriate counter measures must be deployed. Moreover, in order to design
effective and efficient counter measures, the security level quantification of the
organizations' ISs is needed. In this work a new vulnerability-driven methodol-
ogy is presented that utilizes stochastic calculus so as to provide us with a solid
and unbiased number depicting the security level of any IS being analyzed. To
this end, we have designed and implemented a new tool (SQT) that was used to
perform the calculations needed. Two real life scenarios of ISs were presented
and their security level was calculated. It is our belief that the adoption of the
proposed methodology can greatly benefit any organization in evaluating the
security level of its ISs.
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